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The future of the family as envisioned by young adults in Ireland 
Abstract 
This article reports on young university students’ visions of the future of the family in 
Ireland, a country that has experienced dramatic economic fluctuations and extensive social 
change over recent decades. Using a text-based role-play method, we obtained 34 students’ 
written responses to two different scenarios pertaining to the family.  Analysis of these texts 
indicates a strong orientation to a future where religion plays little or no role, and tolerance 
and freedom to choose govern family formation. The fear is expressed that some groups may 
be deprived of the freedom to marry and have children on grounds of economic inequality. 
Together, these two visions create a dialectic between more freedom (in choosing 
values/partners/whether to have children) and less freedom (due to inability to afford the 
‘luxury’ of family life), reflective of the post-Catholic, economically exposed context. We 
show that young agents draw on social debates, traditions, their experiences and social 
positions in imagining futures of the family, illustrating interplay between structure and 
agency. It is interesting and significant that some social forces are seen as catalysts of both 
‘stronger’ and ‘weaker’ families, in particular religion/the Church is used to explain both 
decline and flourishing of the family in the future. 
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Introduction 
In this article, we present findings from an exploratory study of young adults’ visions of 
families in the future. In the field of youth studies, much research has been done recently on 
young people’s views on various aspects of the future (e.g. Carabelli and Lyon 2016; Cook 
2015; Prince 2014; Skrbis et al. 2014; Threadgold 2012), but there is very little research on 
future families envisioned by them. This article seeks to contribute to understanding the role 
of young people and culture in the social change of families: more specifically, the cultural 
meanings that young adults attach to future families. This is important, because both now and 
in the future families are shaped by cultural ideas, beliefs and values about family life. As 
Simon Duncan (2011) underlines, people draw on styles of thinking, the presumptions of 
particular social groups and lived social norms to construct their ideas around families, in a 
process referred to as bricolage. The thought processes that our study participants engaged in 
can be thought as illustrations of bricolage around the notion of families in the future. 
We locate our examination in the context of Ireland. Ireland, with its distinctive combination 
of tradition and modernity in terms of the family, is an interesting socio-cultural context for 
studying the future of families. In May 2015, the Irish electorate voted for same-sex 
marriage; at the same time, the country still has one of the world’s strictest abortion laws 
(abortion is possible only in cases where the life or health of the mother is in grave danger). 
While most countries in Europe are concerned with growing aged populations and low birth 
rates, Ireland’s population is relatively young and fertility rates are among the highest in 
Europe (Gray et al. 2016, 56; Connolly 2015b, 17-34). In addition, intergenerational ties are 
strong (Gray et al. 2016, 70; Scharf et al., 2013). Following late legalisation of divorce in 
1997, divorce rates have remained comparatively low (Connolly 2015b, 24). Sharp economic 
ups and downs have been characteristic of Ireland. The Great Recession, that affected all 
aspects of life in Ireland from 2007 until very recently, was followed by the current very 
rapid economic recovery (Gray et al. 2016, 95). As a market-oriented liberal welfare regime, 
Ireland leaves much responsibility to families and the private sector to cover the support 
needs of people facing social risks. 
The aim of this article is to examine young adults’ ideas surrounding family formation, 
having children and intergenerational relationships in Ireland. We start from the premise that 
visions of future families provide a prism of societal changes that could take place in the 
areas of welfare, work and economy, since families are not just personal relations, but 
intersect many other key structures of society (OECD 2008, 2; Morgan 1996, 11). We draw 
on the life course perspective to understand how and why young adults envision family 
change. The population we examined are university students. University students are only a 
segment of the young adult population, and cannot be construed as representative of the 
broader young adult population. Rather, they have here given us one window (out of many 
possible ones) into observing young adults’ ways of thinking about the future of families; or 
to use Duncan’s (2011) terminology, into how they engage in bricolage around family 
formation and family relations. Conducting this kind of study with a more diverse young 
population, especially if done longitudinally (rather than as a cross-section) would constitute 
an interesting next step that would add analytical depth and variance to the findings. 
Young adults’ vantage point on family change 
The life stage positions of young adults open up a specific perspective on family issues (Gray 
et al. 2016, 59-60). Today’s young Irish adults were born and grew up during the so-called 
Celtic Tiger era (from the 1990s to the early years of the new millennium). This period was 
characterised by rapid and profound socio-economic changes, including a turn from mass 
unemployment and emigration to almost full employment and inward migration, and 
dramatic improvements in the standard of living (Breen and Reynolds 2011). Extensive 
changes in traditional family practices can also be traced back to this period as ‘new’ family 
forms, such as cohabitation, one-parent families, divorce, same-sex families and reconstituted 
families became more prevalent in Ireland. However, the Great Recession (2007-2014) 
followed the Celtic Tiger. The recession affected the economy severely and led to high levels 
of unemployment, mass emigration of working-age adults and strict limits on spending 
imposed by the European Central Bank. In the current post-recession era, Ireland is the fastest 
growing economy in Europe, but the shadow of the recession is still present in many people’s 
lives and indeed constitutes a central, early and enduring influence in the life course of the 
population of interest, young adults who spent their teenage years and early 20s in recession-
era Ireland. For instance, due to the very high housing costs caused by a massive gap between 
demand and supply, many young adults have difficulty to establish independent households 
(Gray et al. 2016, 95-96; 107-108). 
Early adulthood is framed by customs, official rules and expectations surrounding the ‘norm 
transitions’ (Gray et al. 2016, 59-60). Historically, the family has occupied a core position in 
the social structure and religious ethos of Ireland. Catholicism was once all-pervading in the 
country, and its role in forming ideals surrounding the family cannot be overstated. However, 
the clerical scandals and child abuse cases in the 1990s and 2000s have eroded the credibility 
of the Church – in addition to the more profound modernisation processes of the culture and 
society (Breen and Reynolds 2011). Today the traditional norms that formerly confined 
sexual activity, cohabitation and parenthood to marriage have broken down, and Irish society 
is considered to have embraced more secular values in personal and intimate life. Liberal 
attitudes towards same-sex marriage, divorce, cohabitation and births outside of marriage are 
becoming increasingly prevalent (Garry et al. 2006). These changes began later than in most 
other Western countries, but they can still be seen clearly (Gray et al. 2016, 95-96). 
Transitions of young adults towards adulthood have become prolonged and their sequencing 
has become more variable. People remain longer in education and postpone marriage and first 
births to later ages. Most are cohabiting or married in their late twenties or thirties, but 
postponing partnership is also typical. A third of young Irish adults (18-34 year-olds) are still 
living with their parent(s). Delayed adult life transitions are linked to family patterns, 
including the unbundling of marriage, parenthood and household formation (Gray et al. 2016, 
95-96, 100). Nonetheless, the two-parent nuclear family is still the most typical growing 
environment of children in Ireland (Connolly 2015a, 5-9). Many Irish parents rely on 
grandparents for regular childcare, and there is an emphasis on extended family relationships 
(Arber and Timonen 2012; Gray et al. 2016, 70). When compared to the wider European 
context, many of the above-mentioned changes are close to European trends. What is 
distinctive to Ireland, is the later timing and faster pace of these changes. Moreover, some 
Irish family patterns are in clear contrast with general European trends, in particular, divorce 
rate is low, only 6%, and the fertility rate is relatively high, around 1.9 per woman (see 
Connolly 2015b, 17-34). 
Most of the trends described above are typically interpreted as aspects of growing 
individualism (Gray et al. 2016, 101). The individualisation thesis emphasises the growing 
agency and autonomy of the individual in modern western societies. The fragmentation of the 
nuclear family and the diversification of family forms are part of this general understanding 
(Beck-Gernsheim 2002; Giddens 1992, 1999). Some other scholars consider that not all 
pathways are freely and equally available - or desirable - to everyone. The factors that are 
giving rise to different pathways are changes in values and socio-economic contexts within 
which young adults forge their choices (Gray et al. 2016, 101-102). As a result, concepts such 
as ‘the negotiated family’ (Finch and Mason 1993), ‘personal life’ (Smart 2007) or ‘bricolage’ 
(Duncan 2011) have been developed for approaching how people actually ‘do’ or ‘adjust’ their 
life choices in practice.  Young adults act and make choices on the basis of their understandings 
of what is possible and likely; they are linked to social relationships, especially to those of 
family and kin, which inform (but do not determine) their visions on future families. 
The cultural approach and young adults’ envisioning of the future 
Earlier research concerning the future of families mainly leans on demographic trends that are 
based on the predictive approach. (e.g. Jokinen 2014; Parke 2013). The approach of this study 
is not limited to the causal assumptions based on earlier research. Instead, our interest is 
directed to the kinds of developments young people are able to imagine. Our interest lies in 
their imaginary envisioning of the future. Within the sphere of futures studies this approach is 
called the interpretative or cultural approach. In this approach, the identification of cultural 
meanings, practices and values is important (Parhiala 2013). The focus is on the experience of 
young students and their ways of envisioning the future, from their position in life. 
The imagined future is understood in this study as a form of social action. In this way, ‘the 
family’ is also approached as a way of thinking about and describing relationships and 
processes that can be encapsulated as bricolage (Duncan 2011). These ideas, which are based 
on the social constructionist perspective on the family, mean that the focus of the research is 
the process and terms by which the family is described (Gubrium and Holstein 1990, 26). This 
starting point requires an inductive and situationally-sensitive approach. The task of the 
researcher is to make visible the ways in which the family comes to be recognised (Gubrium 
and Holstein 1990, 27). What people do with words does not take place in a vacuum; they take 
account of local understandings of how to think and talk about family life. Our interest is in the 
cultural spectrum of the possible futures of the family, in the context of the early stages of the 
life course of university students. Recognising cultural meanings attached to future families is 
important, because families are shaped by culture: we use existing beliefs and values to create 
and sustain ways of being, relating to, and caring for each other. 
The research method we applied is called non-active role-play method, also known as empathy-
based stories method (Eskola 1997; Forsberg and Nätkin 2016; Ronkainen and Ylijoki 1988). 
Students of social sciences at Trinity College Dublin were asked to write about their visions of 
future families, according to specific instructions, first outlined verbally and then distributed 
in writing during classes. Two contrasting framings (based on our adaptation of the instructions 
used by Ronkainen and Ylijoki [1988]) were offered to elicit the participants’ visions: 
A. Imagine that it is the year 2035 and a large international family policy conference is 
being held at the Convention Centre Dublin. In the conference, it is pointed out that in 
almost every developed industrial country, the importance of the family has grown. 
People get married and have children; the number of divorces has gone down. 
Intergenerational relations are highly valued. Imagine what might have brought about 
the situation. What has happened in the world during the last 20 years? 
B. Imagine that it is the year 2035 and a large international family policy conference is 
being held at the Convention Centre Dublin. In the conference, it is pointed out that in 
almost every developed industrial country, the importance of the family has decreased. 
Being a couple and partnering are short term and are not registered officially. Birth rate 
is low. Intergenerational relations are poorly valued. Imagine what might have brought 
about the situation. What has happened in the world during the last 20 years? 
Each participant formulated only one text (in response to either scenario A or B). One of the 
basic ideas of the method is to offer a tool for research to map the spectrum of cultural logics 
available in a certain socio-cultural context to perceive social phenomena. It has been 
estimated that a culturally essential spectrum of logics will be accumulated, and in about 15 
texts typical framings can be discerned (Suoninen and Jokinen 2014, 38). Even though the 
writing instructions and the fact that all our participants were social science students 
undoubtedly frame the students’ accounts, the students can be seen as creative adapters of the 
meanings related to the cultures and subcultures they represent. By their texts, they can 
disclose the degrees of freedom of cultural meanings. Because of the open form, the role-play 
method often produces expressive and meaning-rich interpretations (ibid.). However, we 
acknowledge that our participants had of course been exposed to various ‘expert’ 
understandings of family and society, as all were social science students, and therefore 
brought to their ‘bricolage’ both personal experiences and notions that reflect the literature 
and professional views (c.f. Savage 2011; Duncan 2011). 
The data consists of 34 texts written by students of sociology, social policy and social work. 
Two groups of students were asked to write about their visions of future families, according 
to specific instructions outlined above, given at two separate lectures in the spring term of 
2016; on each occasion, the students were divided into two groups by where they were sitting 
in the room, each group being asked to address either scenario A or scenario B so that an 
approximately even number of responses to the scenarios was obtained. Most of the students 
were white Irish people, and while their relatively homogenous socio-cultural background is 
recognised as a limitation of our research, it is broadly reflective of the population 
composition, where 85 % of the 4.6 million people in Ireland declare themselves ‘white Irish’ 
(Ni Laoire 2015, 144). Three-quarters of the students were female, reflecting the fact that the 
majority of students of social sciences in Ireland are women. Nearly all participants were in 
the 20-23 age bracket. For reasons of confidentiality, this exercise was entirely based on the 
writings, i.e. the students did not engage in a group discussion of their responses. 
The method of analysis is data-driven content analysis grounded in constant comparison of 
the texts and the common elements in them, a process that bears similarities to thematic 
coding with a strong orientation to identifying categories supported by the major themes (e.g. 
Schreier 2012). Two different collective visions of the families of the future emerged in the 
texts, as one could expect on the basis of the writing instructions. The visions were labelled 
the ‘scenario of stronger future families’ and the ‘scenario of decreasing family-
centeredness’. Within these two broad visions (presented below) the analysis concentrated on 
identification, categorising and grouping together of the explanatory factors that the 
respondents saw as underlying family change. 
Scenario of the stronger future families 
The discussion of this scenario is organised around the two central categories that emerged 
from the data, namely ‘emergence of a new family value system’ and ‘greater gender equality 
and work-family balance’, the two sets of forces that were envisaged to bring about the 
‘stronger families’ scenario. 
Emergence of a new value system 
The most dominant explanatory category for future changes that emerged from the writings is 
the impact of a new value system that is more accommodating of a diversity of family forms, 
especially in terms of couple relationships. The following extract encapsulates the vision of a 
more diverse and tolerant world that is linked to the increase in the importance of families: 
Religious beliefs are no longer a cause for fighting…People can be peaceful, secure and 
hopeful…They are no longer fearful of the future…Difference is accepted globally. 
The types of families that exist are based on love…the world is a happier place to live 
and a more pleasant place to procreate in. (R. A-8) 
This extract crystallizes how tolerance of difference, personal choices and love are the new 
(global) values that frame strong future families in the students’ accounts. The erosion in the 
role of religion is something that the majority of the students consider a likely antecedent to 
value change. On the basis of the writings, the values to be abandoned have parallels to the 
Catholic socio-sexual doctrine (e.g. disapproval of same-sex marriage). The new value frame 
is envisaged to lead to an array of improvements that, instead of stifling family life and close 
relationships, allow them to flourish. The new values of tolerance are crystallised in the idea 
of marriage equality (allowing same-sex marriages), one of the core background ideas 
referred to when outlining the vision of stronger families in the future: 
Individuals in the past may have divorced in part due to their sexuality. Individuals are 
now free to marry regardless of their sexuality…marrying who they truly love. (R. A-1) 
…people are marrying for love and not for any other reason. In the past couples who
generally did not love each other, but were together for social, financial and religious 
reasons would eventually break up and divorce. However, in the last 20 years people 
have not married for any purpose other than love. (R. A-3) 
In these visions, people are free – on the basis of love - to choose whom they marry, a 
freedom that strengthens families. The marriage equality referendum of May 2015 was 
clearly still very fresh in the minds of the students; indeed, it is arguable that this referendum 
was an extraordinary, generation-defining moment in the lives of young Irish people who 
voted overwhelmingly for same-sex marriage. 
At a more abstract level, these envisaged futures can also be construed as a form of 
‘enlightenment’, making way for greater preparedness and a more ‘rational’ or secular 
approach to forming couple relationships and building families. When families are planned 
more deliberately, and formed on the basis of choices, instead of adherence to externally 
imposed (religious) principles, families are imagined to become stronger. The following 
formulations reflect the idea that stable families result from informed, rational choices: 
People now understand that marriage is a commitment and do not want to face the 
hardship of divorce so they wait until they are sure their relationship is stable before 
entering marriage…it is the norm to marry later in life, and there is no pressure for 
couples to marry before or shortly after sharing a home. (R. A-13) 
More couples are moving in together before they are married, ending up with the ability 
to make marriage decisions with less societal pressure and naturally have their children 
later. (R. A-16) 
Excessive use of technology and its side effects of ‘losing physical touch with loved ones and 
seeking solace from iPhone or laptops’ was seen as a development that would make people 
value face-to face interaction more. However, some students also thought that clever use of 
technology would facilitate rational choices of partner that would in turn enhance their 
chances of relationship success: 
Dating sites such as Match.com and even Tinder emphasise shared traits and looks 
before people meet in person. People may find it easier to find the right partner and 
eventually get married. Therefore, pre-knowledge of the person prior to the 
commitment of marriage may reduce the likelihood of divorce. (R. A-17) 
With reference to children and parenthood, the visions of stronger future families suggest 
that more education and understanding of what is ‘good for children’ will strengthen parental 
capacity and competence, leading to more stability and greater child wellbeing. Some of the 
students who make this suggestion appear to hark back to a traditional family form (mother-
and-father), strengthened by parental prudence: 
[People will] know that a stable relationship between a mother and father is an 
important element in the child’s life and so are more likely to stay married. As 
education has increased and thus, awareness of mental health and psychology 
increased, individuals and couples are more likely to seek help or counselling etc. if 
they are having a problem in their life or marriage. (R. A-4) 
Again, the idea of greater rationality in people’s behaviour features as a factor that would 
strengthen families. In particular, future parents are seen as highly rational agents who ensure 
that they are ready and able to face the challenges of childrearing, because they will be 
mature, well-resourced adults: 
Couples are choosing to postpone having children until they are in a position where 
they are able to care for their children. As a result, family breakdown has decreased. (R. 
A-12) 
One interesting sub-theme in the vision of a more rational, planned family life of the future 
relates to the role of reproductive technology. Here, too, the respondent paints a picture of a 
future where parenthood is planned, predictable, and manageable. The reference to (foetal) 
‘pre-screening’ is significant because extensive screening for abnormalities is not done 
routinely in Ireland (largely due to the fact that foetal abnormalities are not acceptable 
grounds for abortion): 
Advances in medicine may also help increase family sizes. In Vitro Fertilisation (IVF) 
may be more readily accessed for women in their forties and fifties, after they have 
advanced in their field of work and have a steady income. IVF treatments are often very 
successful, leading to twin or even triplet births, increasing family sizes. Also, advances 
in general health and pre-screening may make it easier for parents to have healthier 
children…Couples may find it easier to prepare and cater for the needs of children. (R. 
A-17) 
Interestingly (in view of the highly visible campaigning for abortion rights on university 
campuses), abortion is mentioned in a cursory fashion in only a couple of texts, and it is also 
linked to the idea of people adopting more enlightened practices through education and 
awareness: ‘Change in legislation re. abortion – more education and awareness due to this’. 
Pro-choice ideals in combination with ‘enlightened thinking’ also mean, for one writer, that 
‘there will be less out-of-home care for children and [fewer] crisis pregnancies’. 
Greater gender equality and work-family balance 
The second core explanatory category for stronger families in the future pertains to the 
impact of social policies and structural changes, in particular changes in labour market 
participation of women, as well as the supportive role of intergenerational relations. These 
public and private supports are seen as supportive of child-rearing, in particular with 
reference to the cost of caring for young children (a consideration that makes sense against 
the backdrop of the extremely high cost of formal childcare in Ireland).  The respondents 
envision a future where families are more central precisely because women are able to find 
fulfilment as workers and as mothers; this is an idea that runs strongly counter to what are 
still prominent remnants of highly gendered thinking on women and work in Ireland (e.g. the 
Irish Constitution still retains a famous clause that claims to protect women against the 
‘economic necessity’ to engage in paid work ‘to the neglect of their duties in the home’): 
If women were treated equally, they wouldn’t have to spend as long building their 
careers as they do now and therefore could have more time and money to have more 
children. They would also not be afraid of getting pregnant and losing their job or not 
getting enough maternity leave. (R. A-5) 
The idea of women building careers is also linked to the notions around greater rationality 
and choice in relationship-formation as discussed above - although it is interesting to note 
that, in the second data extract below, choosing a male partner still features as taken-for-
granted behaviour for a woman: 
As women follow their career paths, women are getting married at a later stage. People 
are no longer so quick to get married, and thus seem to be ensuring that their romantic 
relationships are healthy and sustainable, before choosing to get married. As a result, 
there is less family breakdown. (R. A-12) 
Women as a group now have their own economic and social standing and have a power 
base. They are able to pick the man that they want rather than having to choose the man 
to support them and give them social status. (R. A-16) 
Several of the imagined changes in family policies are of the kind that encourage and enable 
couples to have children, by alleviating the cost of children, a theme that also comes to play a 
central role in the ‘scenario of decreasing family-centeredness’ (see discussion below): 
Universal health care for all, free education with no third level entrance fees…have 
encouraged people to settle down, marry and have children as there are better 
opportunities for all children across the board. (R. A-3) 
…childcare packages may have become more affordable, making it easier for low to
middle income families to have larger families and work to support the children. (R. A-
17) 
The dual breadwinner scenario is envisaged to materialise through improvements in leave 
policies not just for mothers but also for fathers (paternity leave being very recent in Ireland – 
introduced in September 2016), and through greater reassurances over the quality of childcare 
(an issue that regularly features in the Irish media through exposés of malpractices in 
kindergartens): 
 
Increased maternity leave provisions and in particular an increase in paternity leave 
provisions has made it more practical for couples to have children as it has relieved 
them of the pressure of returning to work and finding childcare shortly after their child 
is born…the introduction of subsidised childcare has made childcare accessible to those 
who need it. Greater regulation of childcare facilities has also increased the standard of 
childcare; this has made parents more comfortable sending their children to childcare 
facilities. (R. A-13) 
 
However, raising children is envisioned to be easier not just thanks to government 
interventions and improvements in formal services, but also through intergenerational 
solidarity within families. The anticipated impact of greater longevity and closer relationships 
with grandparents features in a number of responses that detail the mechanisms whereby the 
importance of grandparental support to younger family members is expected to increase: 
 
…children are more likely to have all four grandparents alive and involved in their 
lives. This has led to intergenerational relations be more valued.  Parents have the help 
of their parents for longer which has contributed to all relationships in family remaining 
close. (R. A-4) 
 
The fact that economic recovery and consequent decline in emigration are expected to 
enhance intergenerational relations is understandable against the backdrop of developments 
over the last decade in Ireland, where the Great Recession that started in 2007 led to an 
exodus of young workers, a trend that is only now beginning to be reversed: 
Unemployment has come down dramatically…the need for economic emigration has 
been diminished…Now that we have more stability economically and politically 
around the world graduates can remain in their country of birth…We have closer 
bonds…greater contact with extended family members. (R. A-10) 
However, not all students saw grandparents simply as a useful childcare reserve. In the 
following data extract the respondent envisages a fortuitous confluence of many factors that 
feed into a scenario where grandparents are closely involved, but less out of a need or family 
obligation, and more on the basis of a choice to cultivate deep intergenerational ties: 
As the level of women in the workplace increases…and often both parents are working, 
official childcare services are more easily affordable for many. Thus, the grandparents 
can adopt a more fun and exciting role in the lives of the grandchildren…Caring for the 
grandchild is no longer viewed as a burden, but instead is time spent building 
relationships. (R. A-12) 
Therefore, while extended family members remain central in this scenario, their role is 
expected to be transformed into a more ‘leisurely’ one due to improved and more affordable 
formal childcare services. 
We will now turn to analysing the texts that put forward imagined reasons for ‘weakened 
families’. 
Scenario of decreasing family-centeredness 
This scenario is organised around two core explanatory categories: economic and labour 
market changes and value changes. 
Economic and labour market changes 
The students expected economic and labour market changes to play a dominant role in 
weakening families. There are two main ‘storylines’ for this scenario, the benign one where 
economic growth and gender equality in the labour market gradually bring about changes, 
and the almost dystopian one where economic inequality leads to a situation where only the 
wealthy can have children. 
On the more benign side, many of the students made a connection between increased labour 
market participation of women and greater gender equality, and a decline in the importance 
of families. However, the pressures of evolving labour markets are not seen as affecting 
women only, but rather the anticipated necessity to be more work-focused, and greater 
geographical distances between family members, are expected to contribute to the decline in 
the centrality of family life. These views echo the widely-shared experience among Irish 
people of witnessing family members and friends emigrate for work, and often settle abroad. 
These notions portray a globalised world where educational and career pursuits are 
borderless, and older family generations are frequently left behind: 
Younger generations might move abroad for college and other career opportunities, 
whereas the older generations might stay in their country of origin. Of course, 
technology might still play a huge role in keeping in touch with the loved ones, 
however it is clearly not the same as face-to-face contact. (R. B-10) 
More drastically, some respondents envisaged a loss of meaning and attachment to the idea of 
romantic love as the demands of work increase and the pace of life intensifies: 
Romantic relationships are not highly valued above work life goals. When individuals 
become too busy to engage in these relationships, they stop. The concept of love is 
seen as an inefficient use of time. (R. B-8) 
The dystopian scenario where the cost of living has become prohibitive, in the sense of a 
serious obstacle to having children, was a predominant category in the data pertaining to the 
‘decreasing family-centeredness’ narration. In this scenario, the cost of living – in particular 
the cost of housing – is envisaged to be so high as to absorb a very large share of earnings, 
even in dual-earner households. The current housing crisis in Ireland (especially in Dublin) 
can be seen to shape these responses: 
The low birth rates have occurred…because of the increasing pressure on people to 
work more in order to provide for a home and the huge cost of living in this country. 
People have given up on the idea of having a nice home and being married with a few 
children…family relations are pushed to the back as people try to keep their heads 
above water to live a decent life. (R.B- 4) 
A corollary of this phenomenon is rising inequality, which in turn means that children are 
imagined to have become a ‘luxury good’, attainable only for the wealthiest: 
…working couples…had to use so much of their income on housing it left them in a
position where they could not afford to have children. Both must be working in order 
to keep a roof over their head…Because of the huge debt…[the government] could 
not implement any worthwhile policies…Those who were really well off could afford 
children…Families are becoming something only the wealthiest can afford (R. B-5). 
Indeed, some responses came close to envisaging a kind of class conflict, where the lower 
earners resent the sense of righteousness and entitlement that the better-off project towards 
those who are deemed to lack the right to have children, due to their low incomes and 
consequent inability to afford children: 
How can I have a child/ren when I have insufficient funds nor can I afford a house, 
childcare, education, a livelihood….why should I have children in a society that 
penalises low-income parents for having children. The snobbery of the middle class 
thinking that they are the moral ones who have the ‘right’ to have children while the 
poor working should not have the ‘right’ to have children because they have not 
earned that right... (R. B-16). 
The economic struggles of low- and middle-income earners are also envisaged to reverberate 
through the generations, and across the entire life course as the high demands of working life 
and the inability to save impact on intergenerational relations and lives at older ages, where 
people are seen to become more individualistic in their orientation to leisure rather than 
family duties: 
Traditionally grandparents would have taken over the role of bridging the child 
minding gap but now their children lived far away [due to economic migration] they 
could no longer do this. As the grandparents were living longer this kept them in the 
labour market for longer as they had to keep earning money in order to pay for 
increased expense of everything. Also a larger number of these older people don’t 
wish to be used as childminders. Having worked for 40 or 50 years they wanted to 
enjoy their retirement. This refusal…to mind their children’s children prevented 
[younger generation] having children. (R. B-5) 
The effect of increased dedication to paid employment is also imagined to be felt in 
generational relations more broadly, including in the parent-young child relationship, and in 
attitudinal differences between younger, more liberal generations and the older, more 
conservative ones: 
To sustain a home in many households means both parents work, which reduces the 
amount of family time. Much of the child’s daily interactions are from an external 
person, usually a worker in a crèche. (R. B-14) 
People value friendship as their family now so if they fall out with actual family 
members it’s not a big deal…due to the referendum and the freedom for same-sex 
marriages and relationships. The older generation has not been accepting of such a 
change and therefore their younger generation family members simply leave them 
behind (R. B-15). 
Intergenerational family relations are also believed to be negatively impacted by 
childlessness and low fertility, divorce, reconstituted families and emigration: older family 
members might find themselves lonely with no one to look after them. 
Change in the value system 
The second major explanatory factor in envisioning the decline of the family in the future 
was the category of values, where the decline of the Catholic Church is referenced as paving 
the way for a decline in the importance of the family. This is particularly interesting because, 
as discussed above, decline of Catholicism was envisaged to underpin the ‘stronger future 
families’ scenario as well: 
One reason why there has been a decrease in the importance of family is because of 
the decline of the influence the Catholic Church has on the population. In previous 
years, people were forced to marry young into committed relationships. Due to the 
political influence that the church had…divorce and marriage separation was not 
possible. The church also had an influence on birth control and education in relation 
to family planning. (R. B-13) 
Other factors are also seen as contributing to the decline in the importance of marriage, 
including a more general change in attitudes towards unmarried people, and the greater 
economic independence of individuals: 
People don’t feel the pressures of society to get married…and think more practically 
in terms of finance, such as the cost of bringing up a child. They do not feel the need 
to marry as unlike in the past, they are more independent and can support themselves. 
(R.B-7) 
Divorce is no longer stigmatised, remarriage and reconstituted families are more common, 
but weakening of the bonds between family members is expected to be one of the 
consequences of this: 
Whereas people used to be married for life, this is no longer the case as people may 
remarry couple of times and might have children with multiple spouses. Once 
remarried, they may have more children with their new partner. As a result, they 
might spend more time with their new spouse and kids. This could put constraints on 
family relationships. (R B-10) 
Lastly, social media and non-kin are seen to offer possibilities for relationships and 
assistance, so that the family is not needed: 
…people are looking more to their networks of friends for support. Technology has
introduced social networks such as Facebook and Twitter where people are engaging 
more with people outside the family. (R. B-4) 
Thus, the importance of social relationships is not weakening; it is the ‘forced’ marriage and 
the normatively imposed family practices that are envisioned to lose their importance. 
Discussion and conclusions 
The young people who participated in this study were able to imagine potential futures of 
families and to assign diverse antecedents to these visions. Obviously, the instructive frame 
story of the writing task and the two versions of the frame story impacted on how the students 
wrote, but the texts are the results of the imaginative ‘bricolage’ (Duncan 2011) that the 
students engaged in. The students explained the future changes in families primarily with 
reference to: 1) the economy and employment, 2) values and religion, 3) family policy and 4) 
technology. These explanatory factors were emphasised differently and partly contradictorily 
in the two scenarios, drawing on aspects of the young people’s life stage positions, 
experiences, their meanings and values together with contemporary debates and wider 
cultural discourses influenced by expert views (c.f. Savage 2011). . 
Of particular note is the fact that two forces, namely religion/Church and women’s 
employment/dual breadwinner scenario, were strongly drawn on to explain both the ‘stronger 
families’ and the ‘weaker families’ scenarios. This emphasises the cultural importance of 
some social forces in family change. The most evident is the role of the Catholic Church as a 
change engine in both visions of the future families. The Catholic Church continues to play a 
strong role in the social imaginaries of young people. This reflects the recent rapid social, 
economic and value changes in Ireland, and a generation that bridges the past and the present. 
In the scenario of the stronger future families, we saw how the students envisage a future 
where old (religious) belief systems and their control over family formation have been 
replaced by a more secular and rational approach. Instead of religious guidelines, the future is 
seen as free from any particular doctrines (this is in the line with the European trend: the 
youngest generations are less religious than the older ones c.f. Collins-May 2012, 81). It is 
striking how many respondents referred to family formation as a rational choice, both in 
terms of choosing ‘the right’ partner (and hence staying together for good) and in terms of 
having children at the ‘right’ time (when career has been established). However, family 
formation is also envisaged to remain value-based in the broader sense that the values of 
freedom, reason and tolerance have come to play a central role in allowing people to become 
self-directing agents who make decisions about family and children on the basis of their own 
choices, which in turn are guided first and foremost by love and more ‘enlightened’ 
approaches to marriage and family formation. This vision mirrors the values social liberalism, 
concerned with gender equality and different family formations and ways of living. In this 
thinking the hetero-normative marriage has given way to multiple forms of families shaped 
by cohabitation, single parents, blended families and same-sex couples (Henricson 2012, 17, 
19–20). It is perhaps particularly encouraging that movement towards greater gender equality 
is seen as a fundamental underpinning of stronger families in the future: the students have 
faith in what is commonly referred to as ‘the Nordic model’ where high levels of gender 
equality go hand in hand with comparatively high (in Western context) fertility rates. 
The most startling aspect of the ‘family decline’ scenario is the notion that family life is in 
the process of becoming differentiated by socio-economic resources. There is evidence that 
aspects of family life are becoming strongly differentiated along social class lines in countries 
such as the United States, where some scholars now allude to marriage as a ‘luxury good’ in 
the light of class-based decline in marriage (Pew Research Center 2010). Most aspects of 
family life in Ireland remain ‘classless’ for now - for instance the number of children per 
woman is not contoured by class (Fahey 2015) - but the students who took part in our 
research indicated that a return to a world where singlehood and childlessness become more 
widespread among lower-income groups is imaginable for them. Indeed, this would 
constitute a reversal to the historical pattern of restricted access to family formation for 
lower-earning groups, which has left large numbers of never-married people (men in 
particular) in the current older population of Ireland (Timonen and Doyle 2014). Fears about 
the future are reflected in this vision, mirroring perhaps the more general cultural logic of risk 
awareness (Beck 1992). Increasing poverty and growing inequalities between families, and 
the implications of these trends for the welfare of future generations have become a concern 
in many European countries. The recent financial crisis, together with austerity measures and 
cutbacks in social protection schemes, has served as a particularly strong impetus for risk 
awareness in Ireland, one of the countries hardest hit by the crisis. One central threat is the 
prospect of total reliance on oneself to cope with everyday life (without state support), 
something that many of our participants had witnessed among their social and family circles 
as people in Ireland took recourse to emigration and other solutions that signalled a profound 
disconnect from the Irish state. 
When compared to the European context, in many respects, young students’ visions of the 
future of the family in Ireland might not appear particularly radical or even imaginative. 
Many of the developments they envisage have already played out in several European 
countries where, for instance, motherhood is not considered a major obstacle to labour market 
participation. In the Irish context, however, progress towards many aspects of gender equality 
is still incipient (for instance, paternity leave was introduced as late as 2016). Therefore, the 
envisioned futures outlined in this article are transformational and far-reaching, from the 
perspective of 20-23-year-old students in Ireland. This contrast to the broader European 
context is intelligible in the light of the different life course experiences of our participants, 
many of whom were witnessing for the first time aspects of transformation in gender 
relations, such as fathers taking paternity leave and more mothers working outside the home. 
Overall, our results evidence the interplay of two rather different forces of advanced 
modernisation and post-industrial economy in Irish society, within which young adults 
envision the future. On the one hand, the students orient strongly to a future where religion 
plays little role, and tolerance and individual freedom to choose govern family formation. 
This can be seen as an aspect of the ethos of individualism which social theorists have more 
generally linked to family change (Beck-Gernsheim 2002; Giddens 1992). On the other hand, 
the data evinces a distinct unease with the ‘economics’ of family life: will it remain 
affordable for all, or will some groups be deprived of the possibility to marry and have 
children? So, contrary to what the individualisation thesis proposes, financial necessity is a 
strong factor in the Irish students’ orientations. Put together, these two visions create a 
tension between more freedom (in choosing values, partners, whether to have children) and 
less freedom (due to inability to afford the ‘luxury’ of family life); this is the dialectic that 
young students in Ireland face as they contemplate their future selves as potential spouses and 
parents, or as single, childless adults. 
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